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Abstract Anthropomorphization, the process of at-
tributing humanlike characteristics to nonhuman enti-
ties, may be resulting from a dual process: first, a fast
and intuitive (Type 1) process permits to quickly clas-
sify an object as humanlike and results in implicit an-
thropomorphism. In a second step, a reflective (Type
2) process may moderate the initial judgement based
on conscious effort and result in explicit anthropomor-
phism. In this study, we manipulated both task instruc-
tions and a robot’s emotionality to investigate the role
of Type 1 vs. Type 2 processing in forming judgments
about the robot Robovie R2. We did so by having par-
ticipants play the “Jeopardy!” game with the robot.
Subsequently, we directly and indirectly measured an-
thropomorphism by administering self-report measures
and a priming task, respectively. Furthermore, we mea-
sured treatment of the robot as a social actor to estab-
lish its relation with implicit and explicit anthropomor-
phism. The results suggest that the model of dual an-
thropomorphism can explain when responses are likely
to reflect judgements based on Type 1 and Type 2 pro-
cesses. Moreover, we show that the Media Equation
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1 Introduction
Anthropomorphism – the attribution of “humanlike prop-
erties, characteristics, or mental states to real or imag-
ined nonhuman agents and objects” [14, p. 865] – is a
common phenomenon. Anthropomorphic inferences can
already be observed in infants. To illustrate, infants per-
ceive actions as goal-directed, and this perception is not
limited to human actions, but also includes object ac-
tions [25, 26]. This shows that as soon as they are able
to interpret behavior as intentional and social, infants
are also able to attribute mental states to objects [3].
However, attribution of human features to objects by
children is not a result of their lack of sufficient cog-
nitive development since depending on a context the
same object may be treated as an alive being or merely
an inanimate thing, e.g. a child may play with LEGO
figures as if it were real knights, but in the next second
drop them in a box.
Furthermore, it has been shown that adults make
anthropomorphic attributions when describing a wide
range of targets, such as weather patterns [28], animals
[12] or moving geometrical figures [19, 30]. Humanlike
form is also widely used to sell products [1, 2]. In ad-
dition, people commonly treat technology in a social
manner, yet they are reluctant to admit any anthropo-
morphic attributions when they are explicitly debriefed
about it [36]. Nass and Moon [36] have argued that
treating technological gadgets as social agents occurs
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independent from the degree to which we anthropo-
morphize them. However, there are alternative inter-
pretations of social responses to technology that were
not considered. Firstly, if people perceive anthropomor-
phism as socially undesirable, they may be unwilling to
disclose that they attribute humanlike qualities to ob-
jects. Secondly, people may anthropomorphize objects
without being consciously aware of it. Thirdly, these
both processes may occur at the same time. This issue
could be a concern especially in the field of Human-
Robot Interaction (HRI), since people tend to anthro-
pomorphize robots more than other technology [22].
Therefore, the question how to adequately measure an-
thropomorphism remains to be examined.
1.1 Anthropomorphism in HRI
The notion of anthropomorphism has received a signifi-
cant amount of attention in HRI. From a methodologi-
cal perspective, various measurements of anthropomor-
phism have been proposed, such as questionnaires [7],
cognitive measures [54], physiological measures [34] or
social behavior [6]. Empirical work has focused on iden-
tifying factors that affect the extent to which a robot
is perceived as humanlike. These studies have proposed
that anthropomorphic design of a robot can be achieved
by factors such as movement [46], verbal communica-
tion [42, 45], gestures [41], emotions [18, 55] and embod-
iment [21]. These factors affect not only the perception
of robots, but also human behaviour during HRI (for an
overview of positive and negative consequences of an-
thropomorphic robot appearance and behaviour design
please see [56]).
To go beyond the investigation of single determi-
nants of anthropomorphic inferences, several compre-
hensive theoretical accounts of anthropomorphism have
been proposed. For example, in their Three-Factor The-
ory of Anthropomorphism [14] suggest three core psy-
chological determinants of anthropomorphic judgments:
elicited agent knowledge (i.e., the accessibility and use
of anthropocentric knowledge), effectance motivation
(i.e., the motivation to explain and understand the be-
havior of other agents), and sociality motivation (i.e.,
the desire for engaging in social contact).
Focusing on HRI in particular, von Zitzewitz et al.
[53] have introduced a network of appearance and be-
haviour related parameters, such as smell, visual ap-
pearance or movement, that affect the extent to which
a robot is perceived as humanlike. Furthermore, they
have suggested that the importance of appearance re-
lated parameters increases with decreased proximity
between a human and a robot, while the importance of
behaviour related parameters increases for social HRI.
Another model proposed by Lemaignan and colleagues
[35] has focused on cognitive correlates that may ex-
plain the non-monotonic nature of anthropomorphism
in long-term HRI. In particular, they argue that three
phases of anthropomorphism can be distinguished: ini-
tialization (i.e. an initial peak of anthropomorphism
due to the novelty effect that lasts from a couple of
seconds to a couple of hours), familiarization (i.e. hu-
man building a model of a robot’s behaviour that lasts
up to several days) and stabilization (i.e. the long-term
lasting, sustained level of anthropomorphism).
While these theories provide insights into the range
of factors that may affect anthropomorphic judgements
and changes in judgments as a function of an ongoing
interaction, so far, previous work has not yet consid-
ered whether anthropomorphism is a result of a single
or multiple cognitive processes. However, understand-
ing the nature of this phenomenon is required in order
to choose appropriate measurement tools as well as can
influence the design of robotic platforms. Previous stud-
ies have indicated that anthropomorphic conceptualiza-
tions of robots differ interindividually on varying levels
of abstraction. According to [23], people are more will-
ing to exhibit anthropomorphic responses when freely
describing a robot’s behavior in a specific context or
when attributing properties to the robot performing
these actions. They were reluctant, though, to ascribe
properties that would characterize robots in general.
However, we suggest that interindividual differences in
anthropomorphism could not only depend on levels of
abstraction, but also on distinct cognitive processes in-
volved.
1.2 Dual process theories and anthropomorphism
Some researchers have proposed that anthropomorphism
is a conscious process [36, 48]. However, currently, there
is no empirical evidence supporting this claim. Since
anthropomorphism has cognitive, social, and affective
correlates it is possible that anthropomorphic attribu-
tions, like attributions in general, are formed as a result
of distinct processes. According to [16], attributions can
be interpreted as the result of two cognitive processes:
Type 1 and Type 2 (see also [11, 24, 44]). The key dis-
tinction between both processes is their use of working
memory and cognitive decoupling [16]. A so-called Type
1 process is autonomous and does not require working
memory. Its typical correlates are being fast, uncon-
scious, having high capacity, involving parallel process-
ing, resulting in automatic and biased responses. On
the other hand, a Type 2 process involves cognitive de-
coupling and requires working memory. Its typical cor-
relates are being slow, serial processing, conscious and
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with limited capacity, which result in controlled and
normative responses.
There is no agreement regarding how Type 1 and
Type 2 processes work together. A parallel-competitive
form [43] proposes that Type 1 and Type 2 processing
occurs in parallel with both processes affecting an out-
come with conflict resolved if necessary. On the other
hand, the default interventionist theories propose that
Type 1 process generates an initial response and Type 2
process may or may not modify it [16]. To date, there is
no agreement as to which form predominates. Moreover,
there are individual differences regarding dispositions
to engage in rational thinking, which may affect Type 2
processes. However, there are fewer dispositional corre-
lates of Type 1 processes [16]. It has also been proposed
that there could be multiple different Type 1 processes
[17].
There are three major sources of evidence support-
ing the existence of Type 1 and Type 2 processes: ex-
perimental manipulations (e.g. providing instructions
that are supposed to increase motivation for Type 2
processing or suppressing it by using a concurrent task
that limits capacity of working memory), neural imag-
ing and psychometric approaches that show a relation-
ship between Type 2, but not Type 1 processing and
cognitive ability [16].
Humans are hardwired to interpret an ambiguous
object as human [5] and this may be a result of Type 1
processing. However, when people are motivated to pro-
vide accurate judgments and Type 2 processing is ac-
tivated, it is possible that they may not necessarily at-
tribute human characteristics to these objects. Based on
this assumption we predicted that Type 1 and Type 2
processes are involved in anthropomorphic judgements
about robots.
In order to distinguish between anthropomorphism
that is a result of Type 1 and Type 2 processing, we
will refer to implicit anthropomorphism as an outcome
of Type 1 process and explicit anthropomorphism as an
outcome of Type 2 process. Furthermore, we will use the
distinction proposed by [13] for direct and indirect mea-
sures. Measures that are self-assessments of participant
thoughts that are measured, are direct measures. On
the other hand, indirect measures involve cognition that
is inferred from behaviour other than self-assessments
of participants.
From the work by [55] we know that a robot’s ca-
pability to express emotions during HRI affects direct
measures of anthropomorphism. However, that study
did not use indirect measures of anthropomorphism. In
order to conclude that anthropomorphism is a result of
dual processing, it is necessary to show that direct and
indirect measures of anthropomorphism are indepen-
dently affected. We hypothesized that the manipulation
of a robot’s anthropomorphism through its ability to
express emotions would affect both direct and indirect
measures of anthropomorphism. On the other hand, the
motivation for Type 2 processing would solely affect di-
rect measures of anthropomorphism (Hypothesis 1 ).
1.3 Social responses to a robot
From the work of Nass et al. [37, 40] on the Media
Equation and “Computers are Social Actors” (CASA)
paradigm, we know that people interact with technol-
ogy in a social way. Thus far, social responses to a robot
have been interpreted as evidence for the fact that a
robot is being anthropomorphized [6]. However, Nass
and Moon [36] have argued that treating technology as
a social actor does not equate to anthropomorphizing it.
This is because, participants in their studies apparently
have explicitly expressed that they do not attribute hu-
manlike characteristics to technology, while at the same
time behaving socially towards it. A distinction between
implicit and explicit anthropomorphism could explain
this paradox: it is possible that people’s social reactions
toward technology are driven by the implicit anthropo-
morphism. On the other hand, when people are asked
to explicitly declare that they perceive a machine as a
human, Type 2 process gets involved and people deny
that they behave toward a machine as if it is a human.
This potential interpretation can be supported by
the work of Fischer [20], who found that there are in-
dividual differences in the extent to which verbal com-
munication in HRI is similar to human-human commu-
nication and only some participants respond socially to
robots. If their responses were fully mindless and auto-
matic, as proposed by Nass, people subjective interpre-
tation of an interaction context should not affect their
social responses. Therefore, we formulated Hypothesis
2 as follows: social responses toward robots are related
with indirect, but not direct measures of anthropomor-
phism.
1.4 Summary and Current Study
Our review of the existing literature on anthropomor-
phism has shown that multiple factors potentially have
an impact on the extent to which robots are human-
ized. However, to date, the process of anthropomor-
phism has been under-researched. Therefore, the cur-
rent study aimed to explore further whether anthro-
pomorphism, just like many other cognitive and social
processes, may be a result of dual processing (i.e., Type
1 and Type 2 processing). To do so, we investigated
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whether the manipulation of participants’ motivation
for Type 2 processing and a robot’s ability to express
emotions affect direct and indirect measures of anthro-
pomorphism. Furthermore, we analyzed the relation-
ship between social responses toward robots, and im-
plicit and explicit anthropomorphism.
2 Method
2.1 Participants
We recruited 40 participants (14 females and 26 males)
who were undergraduate students of various universi-
ties and departments from the Kansai area in Japan.
They were all native Japanese speakers with a mean
age of 21.52 years, ranging in age from 18 to 30 years.
They were paid ¥2000 (∼ e 17). The study took place
on the premises of Advanced Telecommunications Re-
search Institute International. Ethical approval was ob-
tained from the ATR Ethics Committee and informed
consent forms were signed by the participants.
2.2 Materials and apparatus
All questionnaires and the priming task were presented
on a computer that was placed 50 cm in front of the
participants. The robot used in this experiment was
Robovie R2 [52] – a machinelike robot that has human-
like features, such as arms or head (see Figure 1).
Fig. 1 Robovie R2
2.3 Direct measures
In the present research, we used several questionnaires
as direct measures. Japanese version of questionnaires
was used when it was available or otherwise back-translation
was done from English to Japanese.
2.3.1 IDAQ
We measured individual differences in anthropomor-
phism using the Individual Differences in Anthropo-
morphism Questionnaire (IDAQ) [47] as it could affect
Type 2 processing. Participants reported the extent to
which they would attribute humanlike characteristics
to non-human agents including nature, technology and
the animal world. (e.g., “To what extent does a car have
free will?”). A 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not
at all) to 10 (very much) was used to record responses.
2.3.2 Rational-Experiential Inventory
In order to establish if people have a preference for
either Type 1 or Type 2 processing, we administered
the Rational-Experiential Inventory [15] that consists
of two subscales: need for cognition (NFC) and faith
in intuition (FII). Items such as “I prefer complex to
simple problems” (NFC) or “I believe in trusting my
hunches” (FII) were rated on 5-point Likert scales.
2.3.3 Humanlikeness
We included the 6-item humanlikeness scale by [31] to
measure perceived humanlikeness of Robovie R2. Items,
such as inanimate - living, were rated on a 5-point se-
mantic differential scale.
2.3.4 Human Nature - anthropomorphism
To directly measure anthropomorphism we used the
Japanese version of human nature attribution [33] that
is based on [29]. We used Human Nature (HN) traits
that distinguish people from automata. Human nature
implicates what is natural, innate, and affective. [55]
have found that only this dimension of humanness was
affected by a robot’s emotionality. Thus, 10 HN traits
were rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (very much)(e.g. “The robot is... sociable”).
2.4 Indirect measures
2.4.1 Rating of the robot’s performance
We measured the extent to which Robovie R2 is treated
as a social actor with the robot asking the participants
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to rate its performance on a scale from 1 (the worst) to
100 (the best). Nass et al. [37] showed that people rate
a computer’s performance higher if they are requested
to rate it using the very same computer rather than an-
other computer, which Nass and colleagues interpret as
an indication that people adhere to norms of politeness
and treat computers as social actors. Therefore, rating
of a technology performance when performed on itself
is a measure of the extent to which it is being treated
as a social actor. In our study, the robot performed ex-
actly the same in all experimental conditions and any
differences in the rating are interpreted as a result of
changed treatment as a social actor.
2.4.2 Priming task
We measured anthropomorphism indirectly using a prim-
ing task [27, 39] implemented in PsychoPy v1.80.05.
In this computerized task participants were instructed
that their speed and accuracy will be evaluated. They
were instructed that they would see pairs of images ap-
pearing briefly on the screen. The first picture (prime)
always depicted a robot and indicated the onset of the
second picture (target) which either showed the silhou-
ette of a human or an object. Participants had to clas-
sify this target image as either a human or object by
pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. The exper-
imenter explained that speed and accuracy would be
important, but if a participant would make a mistake
he should not worry and continue with the task. Par-
ticipants completed 48 practice trials prior to critical
trials to familiarize with the task. During practice tri-
als, no primes (i.e., images of robots) appeared on the
screen.
In the critical trials, the prime was either a picture
of Robovie R2 or PaPeRo (see Figure 2). We used Pa-
PeRo in order to explore whether participants would
implicitly anthropomorphize only the robot with which
they interacted or whether the effect would show on
robots in general. We used 4 silhouettes of humans and
objects as the target images. Therefore, there were four
possible prime x target combinations (Robovie x human,
Robovie x object, PaPeRo x human, PaPeRo x object).
The prime image was displayed for 100 ms and it was
immediately replaced by the target image that was vis-
ible until a participant classified the target image or for
maximum of 500 ms (see Figure 3). If participants did
not classify the target image within that threshold, a
screen with a message stating that they would have to
respond faster appeared. For each trial, there was a 500
ms gap before the next prime appeared on the screen.
There were 192 trials in total, and the order of pairs of
images was random.
Fig. 2 PaPeRo
   100 ms 500 ms     500 ms
Fig. 3 A sample Robovie x human trial of a priming task. An
image of Robovie was displayed on a screen for 100 ms. It was
followed by an image of a human silhouette that was visible
until a participant classified the target image or for maximum
of 500 ms. A 500 ms gap screen was shown between trials.
2.5 Design
We conducted an experiment based on 2x2 between-
subjects design with the following factors: first, we ma-
nipulated a robot’s emotionality (unemotional vs. emo-
tional) to change the degree of the robot’s anthropo-
morphism [55]. Second, we manipulated participants’
motivation for Type 2 processing (low vs. high) [16].
We implemented an experimental setup similar to
the one described in [55]. The robot emotionality ma-
nipulation took place after the robot received feedback
for response for each question during “Jeopardy!” game.
In the emotional condition, we manipulated the robot’s
response to positive or negative feedback, respectively.
In the unemotional condition, the robot always reacted
unemotionally. The robot we used in this experiment
does not have the capability to convey facial expres-
sions. However, according to [4] body cues are more
important than facial expressions when it comes to dis-
crimintating intense positive and negative emotions. There-
fore, we implemented positive reactions by making char-
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acteristic gestures, such as rising hands, and sounds,
such as “Yippee” to indicate a positive emotional state.
Similarly, negative reactions were expressed verbally
(e.g., by exclaiming “Ohh”) and by using gestures (e.g.,
lowering the head). Previous studies have shown that
body language [8], speech [50] and their combination
[32] are suitable and recognizable means for robot emo-
tion expression. In the unemotional condition the robot
said in Japanese “Wakarimasu” (literally “I understand”,
meaning “OK” in this context) and moved its hands
randomly in order to ensure a similar level of animacy
compared with the other condition. In both conditions,
the robot reactions slightly varied each time.
The manipulation of participants’ motivation to en-
gage in Type 2 processing was realized by changing
the instructions provided to participants after they fin-
ished interacting with the robot. In the high motivation
condition, participants were instructed that their task
performance and responses to the subsequent question-
naires would be discussed after completing them, and
that they would be asked to explain them (see [16]).
In the low motivation condition, participants were told
that the responses would be anonymized. No actual dis-
cussion took place in any condition.
2.6 “Jeopardy!” game
In the “Jeopardy!” game contestants are presented with
general knowledge clues that are formed as answers and
they are asked to formulate an adequate question for
these clues. In the present study, participants were as-
signed the role of the host and Robovie R2 served as the
contestant in the interaction. For example, if a partici-
pant read a clue “There are no photographs, only illus-
trations of this symbol of Mauritius”, the robot should
respond “What is a dodo?”.
A table with cards that featured clues and names
of categories of these clues was placed next to the par-
ticipants. The cards were presented upside-down, with
the bottom side showing clues and the correct response.
On the top side, each card featured a money value that
served to reflect the alleged difficulty of the item. There
were six categories and five questions within each cat-
egory. All participants were told that they would be
assigned to read five questions from category “National
Animals”. We assigned participants to one category in
order to ensure that there would be no differences in dif-
ficulty between the categories. Participants were asked
to read clues in normal pace and they were asked to
provide feedback regarding the robot’s response. After
that they were asked to proceed to the next question.
Within the assigned category, they were allowed to ask
questions in any order desired.
2.7 Procedure
Participants were told that they would participate in
two ostensibly unrelated studies. In the alleged first
study they were asked to report demographics and they
completed IDAQ and the Rational-Experiential Inven-
tory. Upon completion, they were then taken to the
experimental room where the ostensible second study
took place (Figure 4). They were seated 1.2 meters
away from Robovie R2, facing it. Participants were in-
structed that they would play a game with the robot
that was based on “Jeopardy!” TV show. After ensur-
ing that participants understood the instructions, the
experimenter turned on the robot and left the room.
Fig. 4 Illustration of the experimental setup
To ensure that the robot’s responses and actions
were in line with the respective condition, we used the
Wizard of Oz method. This implies that the robot was
controlled by an experimenter’s assistant who was sit-
ting in an adjacent room. The responses were prepared
before the experiment and they were identical for all
participants. The robot would always answer three ques-
tions correctly and would get two other questions wrong.
Incorrect answers would still appear logically possible
as the robot named a wrong animal. After the fifth
question, the robot asked participants to rate its per-
formance on a scale from 1 (the worst performance)
to 100 (the best performance). After that, it thanked
them and asked to call the experimenter. The experi-
menter took participants back to the computer where
they completed the priming task and remaining ques-
tionnaires (humanlikeness and anthropomorphism). Al-
though the order in which direct and indirect measures
are administered is believed to have little impact on the
measures [38], at least in some situations self-reports
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Table 1 Cronbach’s α for questionnaire measures before and
after item deletion.




Human Nature .68 .70
IDAQ .92
can activate the concepts evaluated by indirect mea-
sures [9]. Therefore, in our study questionnaires were
administered after the priming task. After filling out
the questionnaires participants were debriefed and dis-
missed. The entire study took approximately 20 min-
utes including 5 minute interaction time with the robot.
3 Results
3.1 Direct measures
In order to establish the potential involvement of dual
processing in anthropomorphism, we analyzed the effect
of the experimental manipulation and relations between
the dependent variables. Firstly, we checked the reliabil-
ity of the used scales and then computed mean scores on
participants’ responses to form indices for further sta-
tistical analyses. Higher mean scores reflect higher en-
dorsement of the measured construct. Reliability anal-
yses revealed that internal consistency was very low for
FII, given a Cronbach’s α = .38. Due to this fact, we
did not analyze this dimension further. Moreover, we
removed one item from several scales in order to meet
the criterion for sufficient reliability (NFC (i.e. “Think-
ing hard and for a long time about something gives
me little satisfaction.”), humanlikeness (i.e. “Without
Definite Lifespan - Mortal”) and HN (i.e. “nervous”),
so that the scales would reach adequate levels of re-
liability (see Table 1). IDAQ had excellent reliability
(Cronbach’s α = .92).
Secondly, we explored the role of demographic vari-
ables and individual differences as covariates for hu-
manlikeness, HN, and the robot rating. In order to do
that, we included gender, IDAQ and NFC as covariates
in two-way ANCOVAs with emotionality and motiva-
tion as between-subjects factors for humanlikeness, HN
and robot rating. None of these covariates had a sta-
tistically significant effect on dependent variables and
they were dropped from further analyses.
A two-way ANOVA with emotionality and motiva-
tion as between-subjects factors showed that there were
no statistically significant main effects of emotional-
ity (F (1, 36) = 0.83, p = .37, η2G = .02), motivation
(F (1, 36) = 0.11, p = .74, η2G<.01) or an interaction ef-
fect on perceived humanlikeness (F (1, 36) = 0.83, p =





























Fig. 5 Rating of humanlikeness. Attribution of humanlike-
ness as a function of experimental condition.
A two-way ANOVA with emotionality and motiva-
tion as between-subjects factors revealed a main effect
of emotionality on attribution of HN traits to the robot,
F (1, 36) = 5.26, p = .03, η2G = .13 (see Figure 6). In the
emotional condition, participants attributed more HN
to the robot (M = 3.7, SD = 0.46) than in the un-
emotional condition (M = 3.11, SD = 1.06). The main
effect of motivation (F (1, 36) = 1.71, p = .20, η2G = .05)
and the interaction effect were not statistically signifi-
cant (F (1, 36) = 0.04, p = .85, η2G<.01).
p < .05
Fig. 6 Rating of human nature. Attribution of human nature
traits as a function of experimental condition.
3.2 Indirect measures
A two-way ANOVA with emotionality and motivation
as between-subjects factors indicated a significant main
effect of robot emotionality on the rating of its perfor-
mance, F (1, 36) = 5.67, p = .02, η2G = .14, see Figure 7.
Participants rated the performance of the robot in the
emotional condition (M = 72.6, SD = 10.02) higher
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than in the unemotional condition (M = 63.85, SD =
12.87). The main effect of motivation (F (1, 36) = 1.47, p =
.23, η2G = .04) and the interaction effect were not sta-
tistically significant (F (1, 36)<0.01, p = .95, η2G<.01).
 p < .05 
Fig. 7 Rating of the robot’s performance as a function of
experimental conditions.
The internal consistency in recognition accuracy for
human and object target images was high, Cronbach’s
α = .98 and α = .97, respectively. Responses with re-
action times of less than 100 ms or more than 500 ms
were excluded from the analyses. Two-way ANOVAs
with emotionality and motivation as between-subjects
factors revealed that neither the main effects of emo-
tionality, motivation nor an interaction effect were sta-
tistically significant for any prime x target pair, see Ta-
ble 2.
Table 3 shows that there was a weak, negative and
statistically non-significant correlation between recog-
nition accuracy for the Robovie x human pair, and di-
rect and indirect measures of anthropomorphism. There
was also a statistically significant positive correlation
for recognition accuracy between Robovie x human and
Robovie x object pairs, r(38) = .34, p = .03.
Priming tasks are robust against faking responses
and we deliberately administered a task that would only
allow for a response window of 500 ms. We did so to
undermine controlled responses. However, to make sure
that our results were not due to participants who had
artificially slowed down their responses, we analyzed
reaction times and did not find statistically significant
differences for any prime x target pairs. Therefore, this
alternative explanation can be discarded.
3.3 The role of motivation for Type 2 processing on
anthropomorphism
Despite the lack of statistically significant differences of
motivation for Type 2 processing manipulation on an-
thropomorphism measures, it is still possible that par-
ticipants in the high motivation condition provided nor-
mative responses compared with low motivation con-
dition. Therefore, we expected that the relation be-
tween the direct measures of anthropomorphism and
robot rating would be stronger in the low motivation
than high motivation condition, i.e. the direct measures
of anthropomorphism would be stronger predictors of
robot rating in the low motivation than high motiva-
tion condition. We tested it by fitting linear regression
lines separately for the low and high motivation condi-
tions with HN and humanlikeness as predictors of robot
rating.
A simple linear regression indicated that there was
a statistically significant effect of HN on robot rating
in the low motivation condition, F (1, 18) = 5.00, p =
.04, R2 = .22 with β = 7.74. However, the same lin-
ear regression in the high motivation condition was not
statistically significant, F (1, 18)<0.01, p = .95, R2<.01
with β = −0.2 (Figure 8).
A simple linear regression indicated that there was
no statistically significant effect of humanlikeness on
robot rating in the low motivation condition, F (1, 18) =
5.25, p = .14, R2 = .12 with β = 5.25. Similarly, a sim-
ple linear regression in the high motivation condition
was not statistically significant for humanlikeness as a
predictor of robot rating, F (1, 18) = 1.03, p = .32, R2 =
.05 with β = 3.91 (Figure 8).
4 Discussion
In the present research we investigated whether anthro-
pomorphism would be a result of Type 1 and Type
2 processing. Furthermore, we explored the relation-
ship between treatment of a robot as a social actor
and anthropomorphizing it. To do so, we manipulated a
robot’s capability to express emotions in order to affect
the extent to which it is being anthropomorphized and
participants’ motivation for Type 2 processing to dif-
ferentiate between implicit and explicit anthropomor-
phism.
In particular, we hypothesized that a manipulation
of a robot’s anthropomorphism through its ability to
express emotions will affect both direct and indirect
measures of anthropomorphism, but a motivation for
Type 2 processing would solely affect direct measures
of anthropomorphism (Hypothesis 1 ). This hypothesis
was not supported by our results. We did not find statis-
tically significant differences in responses between par-
ticipants in the high and the low motivation conditions.
Neither the attribution of HN traits nor perceived hu-
manlikeness were affected by this manipulation. Simi-
larly, we did not find statistically significant differences
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Prime x target pairs Emotionality Motivation Emotionality x Motivation
Robovie x human F (1, 36) = 1.81, p = .19, η2G = .05 F (1, 36) = 1.16, p = .29, η
2
G = .03 F (1, 36) = 0.45, p = .51, η
2
G = .01
Robovie x object F (1, 36) = 0.90, p = .35, η2G = .03 F (1, 36) = 1.67, p = .21, η
2
G = .04 F (1, 36) = 0.08, p = .79, η
2
G<.01
Papero x human F (1, 36) = 0.91, p = .35, η2G = .03 F (1, 36) = 1.44, p = .24, η
2
G = .04 F (1, 36) = 0.15, p = .70, η
2
G<.01
Papero x object F (1, 36) = 0.94, p = .34, η2G = .03 F (1, 36) = 2.72, p = .11, η
2
G = .07 F (1, 36) = 0.54, p = .47, η
2
G = .02
Table 2 Summary of ANOVAs for each prime x target pair in the priming task.
Fig. 8 Linear regression lines with HN and humanlikeness as predictors of robot rating as a function of motivation for Type
2 processing.
Table 3 Pearson correlations between the recognition accu-
racy for Robovie x human pair and other measures of anthro-
pomorphism as a function of motivation for Type 2 process-
ing.
Motiv. Rob. rating HN Humanlik.
Low Rob. x human -.18 -.38 -.19
High Rob. x human -.08 -.28 -.14
on the indirect measure of anthropomorphism between
the low and high motivation conditions.
We found that the robot emotionality manipula-
tion affected the extent to which it was anthropomor-
phized with people attributing more HN traits when the
robot was capable of expressing emotions. This is con-
sistent with the previous research [55]. However, com-
pared with that study we did not find a significant dif-
ference in the rating of Robovie R2’s humanlikeness.
Nevertheless, the robot in the emotional condition had
higher mean humanlikeness score than in the unemo-
tional condition, which was expected based on the pre-
vious findings [55]. On the other hand, Robovie R2 was
not significantly more strongly associated with the hu-
man category in the emotional than the unemotional
condition, as shown by the lack of difference for Robovie
x human pair between these two conditions. Therefore,
based on our hypothesis that would suggest that people
did not anthropomorphize the robot implicitly.
Hypothesis 2 stated that social responses toward
robots would be related with indirect, but not direct
measures of anthropomorphism. This hypothesis was
not supported. The indirect measure of anthropomor-
phism (priming task) was not correlated with the robot
rating. On the other hand, the direct measure of anthro-
pomorphism was linearly related with robot rating in
the low motivation, but not the high motivation condi-
tion. If people treat technology as social actors, but do
not see it as a human, as suggested by Nass and Moon
[36] for Media Equation theory, the relation between an-
thropomorphism and social treatment of a robot should
not be affected by the motivation manipulation. More-
over, manipulation of a robot’s emotionality should not
affect its social treatment. However, our results reject
these assumptions. This lead us to consideration if our
focus on direct and indirect measures instead of explicit
and implicit anthropomorphism was not too simplistic.
The above discussion is based on the assumption
that direct measures reflect only explicit anthropomor-
phism while indirect measures reflect only implicit an-
thropomorphism. However, some of the obtained results
do not fit this interpretation. If anthropomorphism was
driven purely by the Type 2 process, the relation be-
tween explicit anthropomorphism and participants so-
cial responses toward robots should be the same for
both motivation conditions. Although participants’ mo-
tivation for Type 2 processing did not statistically sig-
nificantly affect direct measures, we observed that par-
ticipants social responses toward robots were related
with direct measures of anthropomorphism only in the
low motivation condition. The effect was stronger for at-
tribution of HN traits, which was a significant predictor
of robot rating in the low motivation condition, while
HN and robot rating were unrelated in the high moti-
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vation condition. While not statistically significant, a
similar pattern can be observed for humanlikeness and
robot rating relationship as a function of motivation
manipulation.
4.1 Model of dual anthropomorphism
We suggest that differentiating between direct/indirect
measures and implicit/explicit anthropomorphism pro-
vides a better explanation of the results reported in this
and previous studies. In particular, the model of dual
attitudes proposed by Wilson et al. [51] can be seen as
analogue to the model of anthropomorphism that we
propose. In particular, the following four properties of
their model are relevant in the current discussion:
1. Explicit and implicit attitudes toward the same ob-
ject can coexist.
2. The implicit attitude is activated automatically, while
the explicit attitude requires more capacity and mo-
tivation. A motivated person with cognitive capac-
ity can override an implicit attitude and report an
explicit attitude. However, when people do not have
capacity or motivation, they report implicit atti-
tude.
3. Even when explicit attitude has been retrieved, the
implicit attitude affects implicit responses (uncon-
trollable responses or those viewed as not represent-
ing ones attitude).
4. Implicit attitudes are harder to change than explicit
attitudes.
A parallel properties of a model of dual anthropo-
morphism would lead to the following interpretation of
our findings. People can anthropomorphize an object
explicitly and implicitly at the same time. The implicit
anthropomorphism is activated automatically and it is
reported by people, unless a person has a cognitive ca-
pacity and motivation to retrieve the explicit anthropo-
morphism. The important implication of this is that the
direct measures of anthropomorphism can reflect either
the implicit or explicit anthropomorphism. In the low
motivation condition participants were not motivated
to engage in an effortful task of retrieving explicit an-
thropomorphism and reported the implicit anthropo-
morphism even in questionnaires. On the other hand,
these measures in the high motivation condition reflect
the explicit anthropomorphism.
If we entertain this idea, it becomes possible to un-
derstand why social responses to a robot are related
with direct measures of anthropomorphism only in the
low motivation condition, but not in the high moti-
vation condition. The indirect responses are still con-
trolled by implicit anthropomorphism despite the ex-
plicit anthropomorphism being retrieved. In the low
motivation condition, the direct measures reflect im-
plicit anthropomorphism, which also drives the uncon-
trolled responses (robot rating) and a positive relation-
ship between the direct measures of anthropomorphism
and social treatment of the robot can be observed. On
the other hand, in the high motivation condition, the
direct measures reflect the explicit anthropomorphism,
while the robot rating is still driven by the implicit an-
thropomorphism. As a result, the relation between the
direct measures and social treatment of the robot is
weaker or non-existent.
The last aspect to consider, is the meaning of the
indirect measure of anthropomorphism (priming task).
Wilson et al. [51] proposed that implicit attitudes are
harder to change than explicit attitudes, which would
translate into explicit anthropomorphism being easier
to change than an implicit anthropomorphism. On the
surface our results are consistent with this hypothesis,
emotionality manipulation affected the direct, but not
the indirect measures of anthropomorphism. However,
if social responses to robots are driven by implicit an-
thropomorphism, there should not be an effect of emo-
tionality manipulation on the robot rating and that is
inconsistent with our data. Alternatively, Wilson and
colleagues [51] hinted that it is possible that a person
can have several implicit attitudes at the same time
and social responses to a robot could be related with a
different implicit anthropomorphism than the one mea-
sured with the priming task. The third possibility that
should not be discarded, reflects the priming task as
a measure itself. In the present experiment we used a
priming task with stimuli that featured silhouettes of
humans to measure implicit associations. A question re-
garding validity of this indirect measurement remains
open. Currently, there are no validated indirect mea-
surement tools with which we could compare our mea-
surement. We expected to find some positive correla-
tions between the direct and indirect measures at least
in the low motivation condition, and between the prim-
ing task and robot rating. However, the correlations
were weak and negative, which makes it questionable
whether our measurement really measures anthropo-
morphism. Future work should focus on development
of indirect measures that can help to disentangle the
influence of implicit and explicit anthropomorphism.
After discussing how the model of dual anthropo-
morphism can explain the results of our study, we would
like to shift the focus to place it in the broader context
of anthropomorphism literature and Media Equation
theory. Airenti [3] in her discussion on anthropomor-
phism brings an example of ELIZA [49], a program
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developed to interact with a user that had a role of
a psychotherapist. It had a rather simple functional-
ity, yet users interacted with it at length. Interestingly,
these users were students and researchers from the same
laboratory as the author of the program and were fully
aware of the nature of the program. Airenti reasons that
while “people may act toward objects as if they were
endowed with mental states and emotions but they do
not believe that they really have mental states and emo-
tions” [3, p. 9] and argues that the interaction context
is key for activation of anthropomorphic attributions
and responses. This view is also echoed in the writings
of Damiano et al. [10]. The results of our study and
the model proposed by us are in line with their pro-
posals that treatment of a robot during an interaction
as if it had mental states can differ from beliefs that it
has them as long as these beliefs represent explicit an-
thropomorphism. According to Airenti [3] and Damiano
et al. [10] people should not anthropomorphize images
of objects since they do not engage in an interaction
with them. However, there are numerous studies that
show that people attribute human characteristics and
mind to images and videos of different types of robots,
e.g. [33, 54]. We argue that the interaction context en-
ables to exhibit anthropomorphic judgements, but is
not necessary for anthropomorphism to occur. These
responses during an interaction are driven by implicit
anthropomorphism. Both implicit and explicit anthro-
pomorphism can drive attribution of human character-
istics to images of robots. We find this interpretation as
more plausible since it can explain anthropomorphiza-
tion of non-interactive objects.
The findings of this study shed also light on the Me-
dia Equation theory [40]. Nass and Moon [36] refuted
the idea that social treatment of technology is a result
anthropomorphism. They based their discussion on the
fact that the users of their studies were adult, expe-
rienced computer users who denied anthropomorphiz-
ing computers when they were debriefed. As shown in
our study, even mere expectation that participants will
need to justify their ratings of anthropomorphism was
sufficient to weaken the relation between anthropomor-
phism and social responses. It is likely that participants
in “Computers are Social Actors” studies would have
even higher motivation to provide responses that repre-
sent explicit anthropomorphism when asked directly by
an experimenter. Instead, Nass and Moon [36] termed
social responses as ethopoeia, which involves direct re-
sponses to an object as if it was human while know-
ing that the object does not warrant human treatment.
However, while ethopoeia does accurately describe hu-
man behaviour, it does not provide an explanation as
to why the behaviour occurs. On the other hand, this
supposedly paradoxical behaviour can be explained by
the model of dual anthropomorphism.
5 Conclusions
This study was the first empirical research that has in-
vestigated the involvement of Type 1 and Type 2 pro-
cessing in the anthropomorphization of robots. The re-
sults thus represent a unique and relevant contribution
to the existing literature on anthropomorphism of ob-
jects in general. The proposed model of dual anthropo-
morphism serves best in explaining the present findings
as well as previous results regarding anthropomorphism
and the Media Equation. In particular, we propose that
people anthropomorphize non-human agents both im-
plicitly and explicitly. Implicit and explicit anthropo-
morphism may differ from each other. Implicit anthro-
pomorphism is activated automatically through Type 1
process, while activation of the explicit anthropomor-
phism requires more cognitive capacity and motivation
and is a result of Type 2 process. In situations when a
person does not have the capacity or motivation to en-
gage in deliberate cognitive processes, the implicit an-
thropomorphism will be reported. On the other hand,
a motivated person with cognitive capacity can over-
ride an implicit anthropomorphism and report an ex-
plicit anthropomorphism. Nevertheless, even if a person
retrieves explicit anthropomorphism, uncontrollable re-
sponses or those viewed as not representing a person’s
beliefs will be still driven by the implicit anthropomor-
phism.
The proposed model of dual anthropomorphism can
explain anthropomorphic judgements about non-interactive
objects, which was not possible based on the previous
ideas that regarded interaction as a key component of
anthropomorphism. Furthermore, we were able to show
that social responses to a robot are related with anthro-
pomorphism as long as people are not motivated to pro-
vide ratings based on the explicit anthropomorphism.
This distinction between implicit and explicit anthro-
pomorphism provides also an explanation for the Media
Equation. The previously refuted link [36] between the
Media Equation and anthropomorphism is an artefact
of narrowing the latter to a conscious, mindful process.
Considering the ease with which people attribute hu-
man characteristics to objects, it becomes improbable
that such a process of anthropomorphism is an accu-
rate representation of human cognition. According to
our model, social treatment of technology reflects the
implicit anthropomorphism. This can also explain why
even people who develop robotic platforms regularly de-
scribe them in anthropomorphic terms despite knowing
that these machines do not feel or have emotions.
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Finally, the proposed model has implications for the
measurement of anthropomorphism. Obviously, there is
a clear need for development of valid indirect measures
of implicit anthropomorphism. These measures will per-
mit researchers to go beyond the existing direct mea-
sures and to shed light on the unique consequences of
both types of anthropomorphism on human-robot in-
teraction.
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